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In this note, we consider a multisector macroeconomic model under oligopolistic
competition. We analyze the effect of an increase of the number of sectors on equilibrium
price and on allocations, when the number of oligopolits of each type is constant. We also
show that a tax policy has more impact on aggregate activity when the economy has many
sectors. Additionally, the tax multiplier is higher than the expenditure multiplier.
This note is a macroeconomic piece of a more general research devoted to cooperation and coordination failures under strategic
interactions.
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In this note, we extend the two-sector Cournot-Nash model proposed by Cooper
(1999)1. We thus consider a general oligopoly equilibrium macroeconomic model
with L sectors in the spirit of Hart (1982), Jones and Manuelli (1992) or Roberts
(1987). In order to simplify, we only focus on strategic interactions on the output
markets and do not develop the labor market analysis2. Thus the environment
is the same as in Cooper (1999), the only modi￿cation is the introduction of a
large but ￿nite number of sectors. Introducing several sectors has two advan-
tages. Firstly, the model proposed generalizes the two goods framework and puts
forward the strategic interactions among many markets3. Secondly, the macro-
economic consequences of market distorsions caused by imperfect competition
on equilibrium prices and allocations can easily be captured by extending the
size of the economy, instead of replicating it. In the model, we henceforth keep
constant the number of agents within each sector.
This paper therefore captures the consequences of market power on equilib-
rium allocation within a macroeconomic perspective. We restrict the analysis
to symmetric Nash equilibrium4. Additionally, we study welfare and economic
policy under balanced-budget rule (Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (1997)). Within
this framework, four kinds of results are obtained. Firstly, when the number
of sectors increases unboundedly, with a constant number of agents competing
in each sector, the market prices and the equilibrium allocations do not con-
cide with the competitive ones. Secondly, welfare increases with consumption
when the economy becomes large, with a constant number of agents per sector.
Thirdly, it is shown that the multiplier increases with the number of sectors.
Fourthly, introducing a uniform taxation policy, we notably establish that the
tax rate multiplier is higher than the expenditure one. Additionally, the tax rate
increases with the number of sectors in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we describe the basic economy.
In section 2, we consider the optimal strategic plans and determine the symmet-
ric macroeconomic equilibrium. In section 3, we study welfare and the multiplier
through economic policy under balanced-budget rule. We notably compare the
magnitude of the tax multiplier with the strengh of the expenditure multiplier.
In section 4, we conclude.
1See Cooper, section 1, Chapter 3. See also Cooper and John (1988), Hart (1982), Jones
and Manuelli (1992) or Roberts (1987).
2The labor market could be introduced without changing the main features of the model.
3The model analyzed here can be represented as a two-step game that arises between
producers: in a ￿rst step, equilibrium prices are determined for given strategies; in a second
step, the equilibrium strategies are determined at these equilibrium prices. This framework
has some connections with the concept of oligopoly equilibrium for pure exchange economies
notably developed by Gabszewicz (2002).
4Imperfect competition holds in all markets. We thus do not consider di⁄erent degrees of
competition between markets. This assumption precludes asymmetric equilibrium concepts.
12 The economy
Consider a L-sector economy with Ln agents indexed h, h = 1;:::;Ln, with n
agents per sector. All agents are identical within a sector. There are L con-
sumption goods indexed ‘, with ‘ = 1;:::;L, and money, which is the numØraire
commodity for which all agents have an endowment ￿ mh, 8h. The price of money
is then equal to 1, while the prices of good ‘ is denoted p‘, 8‘. Each good ‘,
‘ = 1;:::;L, is produced in quantities yh‘ according to the same constant re-
turns to scale technology, so total costs are a linear function of production5. We
assume that any agent of one type consumes only the goods produced by the
agents of the other types. This feature captures the decentralization of economic
activities: the specialization in production and the generalization in consump-
tion6. Additionally, each agent h holds real balances mh. The preferences of
















￿ ￿‘yh‘ , 8h for k 6= ‘ , (1)
where ￿hk 2 (0;1), 8k measures the strengh of the demand linkage across all
sectors and ￿‘ 2 (0;1), 8‘ is the marginal disutility of production for good ‘.
Each oligopolist determines ￿rst as a consumer his demand for the good and
money. After, he determines as a producer his strategic supply. The program of








pkchk + mh ￿ p‘yh‘ + ￿ mh , 8h for k 6= ‘.
(2)
For given yh‘, the demand functions are chk = ￿hk
￿h
pk , 8k 6= ‘ and mh =
(1 ￿
P
k ￿hk)￿h, where ￿h ￿ p‘yh‘ + ￿ mh.
Each oligopolist then maximizes his indirect utility function in order to de-
termine his strategic supply, taking as given the supply of other oligopolists
within their sector, i.e.
P
￿h y￿h‘, the price of the other goods pk, 8k 6= ‘ and
the income of the other sectors ￿k, with ￿k =
P
h(pkyhk + ￿ mh), 8k 6= ‘. The
















Ayh‘ + ￿ mh
3
5 ￿ ￿‘yh‘. (3)
This leads to the n ￿rst-order conditions, where marginal revenue balances
marginal cost:
5The distribution of pro￿ts and its e⁄ects in the economy are thus deleted.












￿ ￿‘ = 0 , for ‘ 6= k. (4)
These n optimality conditions puts into perspective sectoral and intersec-
toral strategic interactions and involve market equilibrium. The other (L￿1)n
optimality conditions are similarly de￿ned.
3 Symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium
A symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium is a price level ~ p, with ~ p = ~ p‘, 8‘, and
an allocation per oligopolist ~ yh‘, with ~ yh = ~ yh‘, 8h, 8‘ such that all markets
clear and each oligopolist optimizes at this allocation for these prices.
The equilibrium concept is a two-step subgame perfect equilibrium. In the
￿rst step, each agent determines his best supply strategy taking as given the
equilibrium price system (the market clearing conditions) and the strategies of
all other oligopolists. In the second step, the equilibrium prices which clear all
markets are determined. The game is solved by backward-induction, so the price
system, which clears all markets, is ￿rstly determined, and after oligopolists
interact in quantity spaces in order to determine their equilibrium strategies.
Thus, the equilibrium prices which clear all markets is determined for given
strategies and the equilibrium level of activity is determined through strategic
interactions (between reaction functions) in quantity spaces.
Within each sector, each oligopolist rationally expects the equilibrium price
that clears the market when he determines his optimal plan. The market-













k z ￿ ￿‘ = 0 , for ‘ 6= k , (5)
where z = 1 ￿ 1
n represents the mark-up in sector ‘8. Hence, the extent of
imperfect competition in each market depends on the number of ￿rms and also
on the number of sectors in the economy.
At a symmetric general oligopoly equilibrium, we obviously have ￿h‘ = ￿‘,




￿k = ￿ ￿, the








We deduce the reaction functions of any oligopolist h, h = 1;:::;Ln, in the
symmetric case:
7The market-clearing conditions involve monetary prices ￿ la Shapley-Shubik (1977).
8The term ￿1=n represents the inverse of the price elasticity of demand evaluated at the
equilibrium (￿1) times the market share of oligopolist h, i.e. 1=n, 8h = 1;:::;n.






, 8‘, 8k 6= ‘. (7)
The equilibrium level of output per ￿rm in each sector ~ yh‘ is given by ~ yhk =
~ yh‘, 8k 6= ‘:
~ yh‘ =
￿
(L ￿ 1)￿ ￿




, 8h, 8‘. (8)
The equilibrium level of activity per sector is then given by averaging (10)
over the n agents within each sector:
~ y‘ =
￿
(L ￿ 1)￿ ￿





where ￿ m =
P
h ￿ mh. Under the assumption (L ￿ 1)￿ ￿ > 1=2, the multiplier is
greater than one9.
Proposition 1 When the number of sectors increases unboundedly, with a con-
stant number of agents per sector, the equilibrium market price and the equilib-
rium allocations do not coincide with the competitive ones.
Proof. We compute the macroeconomic equilibrium, i.e. the price level ~ p
and the allocation reached by any oligopolist, i.e. ~ yh‘, 8h, 8‘, and compare it
with the result that would be obtained in a competitive environment. When
the economy becomes large, i.e. L ! 1, with ￿ ￿ ’ 1=L, the price and the













e p , 8‘. Under perfect competition, each agent maximizes his















k6=‘ pkchk + mh ￿ ￿ mh +
p‘yh‘, 8h for ‘ 6= k. This gives the demand chk = ￿hk
￿h
pk , 8h, 8k and mh =
(1 ￿
P




k6=‘ ￿hkp‘ = ￿‘, 8‘. Since by symmetry, ￿h‘ = ￿ ￿, 8h, 8‘ and ￿‘ = ￿, 8‘,
the competitive price p￿














, 8‘, 8h. Finally, (p￿;y￿
h‘) 6= (~ p; ~ yh‘). QED.
Proposition 1 means that growing the economy does not lead to mimic the
results obtained in an environment where the number of agent becomes arbi-
trarily large, or when the economy is replicated an in￿nite number of times.
Intrasectoral market power is not equivalent to intersectoral market power: the
e⁄ects of market shares generally di⁄er from the e⁄ects of market size10.
9In Cooper￿ s model, the same condition holds when L = 2.
10When ￿ ! 1 in each sector, the equilibrium price and the corresponding allocations
co￿ncide with the competitive ones (see Cooper (1999) for L = 2).
4Proposition 2 Welfare increases with consumption when the economy becomes
large, with a constant number of agents per sector.








￿ ￿‘yh‘. We have to show that @ ~ Uh
@~ yh‘ > 0,










￿￿‘, 8‘. From (8), we deduce @ ~ Uh
@~ yh‘ =
[~ p(￿)]
1￿(L￿1)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿‘ > 0, 8‘ for h = 1;:::;Ln, if z < 1. QED.
As in Cooper (1999), the payo⁄ of any agent increases with the degree of
competition in markets. This positive externality within a sector is associated
with an increase in the degree of competition in the other sectors: more trades
imply lower markups and thus lower price for agents of the remaining sector11.
Proposition 3 The expenditure multiplier increases with the number of sectors.




@L = ￿ ￿
[1￿(L￿1)￿ ￿]2 > 0 since
@~ y
@( ￿ m=p) =
(L￿1)￿ ￿
1￿(L￿1)￿ ￿. QED.
The preceding proposition exampli￿es that the impact of the multiplier is
higher when the number of commodity increases in the economy.
As an example, consider L = 2 and L = 3. Then, we respectively have
@~ y
@( ￿ m=p) = ￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿ and
@~ y
@( ￿ m=p) = 2￿ ￿
1￿2￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿
1￿￿ ￿ since here ￿ ￿ < 1=2.
4 Economic policy
In order to regulate market distorsions caused by imperfectly competitive be-
haviors, consider a taxation policy on strategic supplies under balanced-budget
rule12. We thus assume that a uniform tax ￿, with ￿ 2 (0;1), must be paid by
each strategic supplier in order to ￿nance some government expenditure G‘, 8‘,
with G‘ = G, 8‘. At the symmetric general equilibrium13, one has G = ￿~ y.
















pkchk + mh ￿ p‘(1 ￿
￿)yh‘ + ￿ mh, 8h for k 6= ‘. The corresponding market-clearing conditions write
p‘ =
￿(￿)
y‘ +p‘￿y‘, 8‘: Following the same procedure as in section 3 allows us to
determine the price of each commodity ‘, ‘ = 1;:::;L, and the aggregate output
per sector:
11There is also a congestion e⁄ect due to the increase of competitiveness in each sector, which
decreases the utility of each oligopolist. But such an e⁄ect is dominated by the preceding (see
Cooper (1999)).
12See Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (1997) for a dynamic perspective in a one sector general
equilibrium model.









(L ￿ 1)￿ ￿




Proposition 4 The level of activity increases with the tax when the tax rate
exceeds the markup.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium tax ￿ 2 (0;1). We have to show
@~ y
@￿ > 0 if ￿ >















~ y. Little algebra give
@~ y
@￿ > 0 if ￿ > 1 ￿ 1
n. QED.
The e⁄ect of a tax policy depends here on the extent of market power: when
the economy becomes less imperfectly competitive, the markup decreases and
provides an incentive for oligopolists, through the multiplier, to increase their
supply. When ￿ ￿ z, the taxation policy has no e⁄ect; it is (entirely) ￿ absorbed￿
in the markup.
Proposition 5 The tax multiplier is stronger than the expenditure multiplier.
Proof. Immediate. From (9) and (11), we have
@~ y






@( ￿ m=p) since ￿ 2 (0;1). QED.
When the magnitude of the multiplier depends not only on ￿ but also on ￿,
the impact of an increase in autonomous expenditure ￿ m=p is reinforced by the
government additional demand, which tends to excite economic activity.
Proposition 6 The tax multiplier increases with the number of sectors.






(1￿￿)[1￿(L￿1)￿ ￿]2 > 0. QED.
Let us now consider the equilibrium tax rate. Using (10) and (11), the











1 ￿ (L ￿ 1)￿ ￿







Equation (12) has multiple solutions. So, consider the competitive case for















The preceding model notably shows that the impact of the (tax) multiplier is
magni￿ed when the economy becomes large. Additionally, the tax multiplier is
stronger than the expenditure multiplier. These results could be compared with
those obtained under monopolistic competition with free entry.
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